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CONCENTRATION AS A FACTOR IN
ANTIMERGER LITIGATIONf
G. E. HALE*
ROSEMARY D. HALE**
Using the recent VON'S GROCERY case as a background, the
authors expand their discussion into an analysis of the irrelevancy
of concentration in an industry in evolving a valid test of the legality
of a merger within that industry. They effectively criticize the
reasoning in the leading case by carrying it to its logical, though
absurd, result. The discussion goes on to illustrate that such reason-
ing becomes faulty when it begins to look not only to the portion
of the market which is controlled by the parties desiring to merge,
but also to the general degree of concentration in the industry, the
amount of the market controlled by an arbitrarily chosen number of
large competitors in the industry, the trend toward or away from
merger generally within the industry, and the fact that suck industry
became concentrated through earlier mergers. Finally, the authors
show that while existence of concentration is a strike against the
legality of a merger, lack of suck concentration does not favor the
validity of a merger.
I. THE PROBLEM
Several of the statutes commonly known as the antitrust laws
may reach corporate mergers and acquisitions. Prominent among
them are section I of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton
Act. Responding to real or imagined demands of the Congress, the
United States Supreme Court in recent years has applied antimerger
legislation with dramatic vigor. To the amazement of the practicing
bar, acquisitions have been forbidden even though there was no
competition between the acquired and acquiring firm. Thus mergers
between firms vertically related as supplier and customer have been
deemed illegal.1 In other instances acquisitions have been stricken
down even when the parties enjoyed no such relationship and did not
compete in any manner.
2
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Illegality has been found when the merger might merely impair
potential as opposed to actual competition. Similar results have
flowed from a finding that joinder of the parties might result in prac-
tices of a questionable character. Thus we learned that a merger
whereby a resulting firm might practice reciprocity would be deemed
unlawful even though reciprocity itself had theretofore been deemed
legal .4
Exemptions from antitrust coverage have diminished under re-
peated attacks by the Attorney General. A pipeline whose acquisition
had been approved by the FPC found that its conduct was still subject
to review under the terms of section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 An enter-
prise which could not meet its obligations as they became due could
not qualify as a "failing firm" and hence be acquired by a competitor.
By implication, only bankruptcy and the auction block sufficed to
support that exemption." Finally, the United States Supreme Court
has thrown grave doubts on the well-established doctrine that a merger
will be held unlawful only if it substantially impairs competition
within a defined geographic area.7
Against a shower of such precedents, many lawyers have thrown
up their hands in despair. They do not believe that there is such a
thing as a merger which will pass muster with the courts. If this be-
lief is correct, it follows that there is no reason to examine the criteria
previously developed for testing the validity of a merger. In the hope
that such a view is unduly defeatist in character, we approach the
topic of concentration. The fact of concentration in an industry is
frequently given as a reason for invalidating a merger. Hence we in-
quire into the nature of concentration and analyze its application to
the preservation of a competitive system.
II. CHOSIG THE RIGHT NUMBER
The test of concentration varies a good deal from case to case.
Thus in some instances concentration will be found because the two
largest firms in the industry are thought to enjoy an undue share of
the market. In litigation involving the plumbing industry, for example,
an acquisition by Crane was found unlawful because after the merger
Crane and American Radiator combined, the two largest firms, would
3 Hale & Hale, "Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's
Crystal Ball," 1964 S. Ct. Rev. 171.
4 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
5 California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
6 Hale & Hale, "Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the Antitrust Laws,"
52 Ky. L. J. 597 (1964).
7 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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make two-thirds of the sales in the industry.8 In other cases the three
largest firms have been used to test the existence of concentration.9
Indeed few numbers have been overlooked. Thus courts have also re-
ferred to the four, five, six, ten, twelve and twenty largest enter-
prises.10 Customarily, however, the test has been the combined market
shares of the largest firms; that is, regardless of whether the number
of firms to be taken is two, four, or more, it has always been a ques-
tion of whether the combined market shares of those firms was deemed
objectionably large.
Concentration is only an ancillary factor in determing the legal-
ity of a merger. Central to the resolution of the legal issue is the ex-
tent to which the acquiring firm's market share will be augmented by
the acquisition. Thus if a firm already enjoys some fifteen percent of
its industry (however defined), adding another five per cent by merger
may be found unlawful. In reaching that conclusion the existence of
concentration is merely an additional factor to be considered."
III. THE NEW DEFINITION OF CONCENTRATION
Into this well established routine of Big Two's, Big Three's, and
the like, there has suddenly emerged a new concept of concentration.
8 Crane Co. v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir.), aff'g per curiam, 185 F.
Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Inland Container Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 17,012, at
22, 120 (1964); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274, 1406 (1960). In United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551 (1966) it was said:
These facts show a very marked thirty-year decline in the number of brewers
and a sharp rise in recent years in the percentage share of the market controlled
by the leading brewers. If not stopped, this decline in the number of separate
competitors and this rise in the share of the market controlled by the larger
beer manufacturers are bound to lead to greater and greater concentration of
the beer industry into fewer and fewer hands.
0 Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 768, 792 (1957), aff'd., 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir.
1961).
10 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 300
(1962) (referring to the market share of the twenty-four largest manufacturers);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966); A. G. Spalding & Bros.,
Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 612, 628 (3d Cir. 1962); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F.
Supp. 651, 656 (D.NJ. 1964); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp.
576, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962). See B. Bock,
Mergers and Markets: An Economic Analysis of Case Law at 61-63 (1960); The
(National Industrial) Conference Board: Studies in Business and Economics (No. 69,
1960).
11 But cf. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964).
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In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,12 the trial court adhered to
the usual concepts of concentration set forth above. It noted, for ex-
ample, that the market shares of the Big Twenty grocery chains in
the Los Angeles area had increased from 43.8 percent to 56.9 percent
of the market between 1948 and 1958.'1 Despite that increase, the
small market shares of all the grocers, and particularly those of the
merging parties, together with other factors such as ease of entry,
convinced the trial court that the acquisition would not have anti-
competitive effects. The merger was found not to have resulted in an
increase in concentration in the retail grocery business. For making
that finding, the district court was rebuked. The conclusion that there
had been no increase in concentration was said by the Supreme Court
to be
completely contradicted by . . . the steady decline in the number
of individual grocery store owners .... It is thus apparent that the
district court . . . used the term 'concentration' in some sense other
than a total decrease in the number of separate competitors, which
is the crucial point here. 14
Those views were amplified in other portions of the Supreme Court's
opinion. For one, the Court considered the "rapid decline in the num-
ber of grocery store owners."' 5 It also mentioned a "continuous trend
toward fewer and fewer owner-competitors." Furthermore, the opinion
contained a reference to a "continuous decline in the number of small
businesses." 6 Note the addition of the word "small," which had not
previously appeared in a consideration of the existence of concentra-
tion. The Supreme Court was obviously concerned not with market
shares or the absolute number of competitors, but with the number of
a particular type of competitor, namely the owner-operator of a single
grocery. Thus it spoke of an increase in the number of chains with
two or more stores and a decline in the number of single store
owners.'7 This language suggests that it is necessary to characterize
12 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 273 n.3.
15 Id. at 277.
16 Id. at 278.
17 Id. at 273. Cf. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) wherein the
Court noted the decline in the total number of breweries (not brewing firms) from 714
to 229 as indicating that the merger was unlawful. Here again emphasis is placed on the
individual productive plant, but, unlike the opinion in Von's Grocery, nothing is said
about a decline in single brewery firms.
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members of an industry by reference to their type of ownership in
order to determine whether concentration exists.
For example, assume that a thousand competitors deal in a cer-
tain product and geographical market. Even if each competitor were
of identical size and thus none enjoying more than one tenth of one
percent of the market, the Court's new test would permit a finding of
concentration if each of the competitors operated more than one re-
tail outlet. This is a wholly different concept of concentration than
that which appeared in the earlier cases. It does not follow the eco-
nomic doctrines which underlie the assumptions made in the older
cases. From an economic point of view the character of the ownership
(multistore as opposed to single store) is irrelevant. Ownership has
no more bearing on the competitive nature of the market than would
the determination that too many groceries were owned or operated
by whites or nonwhites."8
Throughout the opinion it is apparent that the court thought it
was somehow preserving a form of enterprise from the onslaught of
rapacious buccaneers. As the dissent points out, the majority opinion
is redolent with the nostalgia of an earlier day. Presumably, an at-
tempt is made to restore economic conditions of more than a genera-
tion back. Thus in the dissenting opinion it was said:
Section 7 was never intended by Congress for use by the Court
as a charter to roll back the supermarket revolution. Yet the Court's
opinion is hardly more than a requiem for the so-called 'Mom and
Pop' grocery stores-the bakery and butcher shops, the vegetable
and fish markets-that are now economically and technologically
obsolete in many parts of the country. No action by this Court
18 The dissenting opinion in Von's Grocery, using conventional tests of concentration,
found the market to be unthreatened. Thus it was said:
. .. In any meaningful sense, the structure of the Los Angeles grocery market
remains unthreatened by concentration. Local competition is vigorous to a fault,
not only among chain stores themselves but also between chain stores and single-
store operators. The continuing population explosion of the Los Angeles
area, which has outrun the expansion plans of even the largest chains, offers a
surfeit of business opportunity for stores of all sizes. Affiliated with cooperatives
that give the smallest store the buying strength of its largest competitor, new
stores have taken full advantage of the remarkable ease of entry into the
market.
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 287-88 (1966). The dissenting opinion
went on to point out the lack of substantial barriers to entry into the industry. Id. at
300. The merit of the concept may be tested by putting the problem in reverse. Suppose
Ford and General Motors proposed to merge. Would it be relevant that there had been
an increase in the number of automobile factories?
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can resurrect the old single-line Los Angeles food stores that have
been run over by the automobile or obliterated by the freeway.' 9
However this may be, the merger in question did not terminate the
separate ownership of a single-store grocery. Both parties to the mer-
ger owned multiple stores, together operating some sixty-six retail
outlets. The only way in which a ban on the merger could possibly
assist in the preservation of the "Mom-Pop" stores would be the hope
that somehow it might blunt the competition offered by all chain and
supermarket operations. It is doubtful that such a result could flow
from the mere banning of a merger between two chain stores2 °
Another interesting question is whether the new definition of
concentration expounded in the Von's Grocery case will be applied in
antimerger litigation generally. In many industries, factors of indivisi-
bility make it inconceivable that there could be "owner-operated"
enterprises to protect. There are, for example, no "Mom-Pop" re-
fineries in the petroleum industry. If the new definition cannot be
applied, are the courts to return to the older test of concentration out-
lined above? Are the two tests to continue as alternative methods of
attacking mergers? Or does the newly propounded test supplant the
old one? In the latter case, as suggested above, it would be difficult
to take concentration into account in industries where economies
of scale render it impossible for small enterprises to exist.2 '
19 Id. at 288.
20 Additional factors in the Von's Grocery case are of interest. In some degree the
Court relied on the fact that other mergers had taken place after the questioned acquisi-
tion. Id. at 273. Oddly enough, however, those other mergers were not linked to any
change in concentration ratios but the continuance of numerous mergers was said alone
to constitute a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. Thus other mergers between firms after
the questioned acquisition can render the questioned merger unlawful. More orthodox
stress was laid on the fact that the acquisition in question would move the defendant up
to the number two position in the market. Id. Attention is also invited to the fact that
the opinion stressed the prior success in growh of the participants to the merger. Perhaps
that can be said to suggest awareness that blocking a merger may impede growth. Atten-
tion is further invited to the reliance on post-acquisition evidence found important in
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
Most striking is the implication that under the ordinary test concentration would
have been deemed acceptable. Also that the market shares of the parties, totaling some
7.5% according to the reviewing court, were not sufficiently high, apart from other
factors, to hold the merger unlawful. Such an implication appears to be inconsistent
with the position taken in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
21 Perhaps it is worth noting that in the more recent case of United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966), the concept of concentration seems to have swung
back to its pre-Von's Grocery form, although mention was made of a decline in the
number of breweries, as opposed to the number of brewers.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF CONCENTRATION
Prior to the Von's Grocery case concentration was found when
the Big Two, Big Three, and the like, had combined market shares
which exceeded a figure thought acceptable. Let us examine the ratio-
nality of such a test.
We start our examination with the method used to choose the
number of firms whose market shares are to be considered. How is it
that in one case the court looks to the Big Two and in another case
to the Big Twelve? Among economists a frequent measure of con-
centration is found in the combined market share of the Big Four in
an industry, but no one has ever suggested a reason why it is more
logical to pick four or five rather than three. The choice of the number
can, of course, make a great difference in the outcome. An industry in
which the two largest firms do two-thirds of the business is certainly
a great deal more concentrated than one in which the Big Twelve
enjoy that volume of the market. This fact gives rise to the suspicion
that the number has been chosen with a view to the conclusion which
the court wishes to reach. This is particularly disturbing when in-
dustrial usage has traditionally referred to one number and the court
uses a higher one. In the manufacture of automobiles, for example,
it has been common to refer to the Big Three. If a court were to
choose some number other than that which has been used in the trade,
a question would naturally arise as to how that other number was
chosen. The question becomes even more vivid when the number is
enlarged with the effect of including one of the parties to the merger
in the Big X. Take, for example, an industry of ten firms, three of
which are recognized as the Big Three. Firms four and nine propose
to merge. If the court then starts talking about the market share of
the Big Four, one may suspect that the choice was arbitrary, just as
one would find a reference to the Big Two difficult to sustain.
Despite the foregoing considerations there is little articulation
in opinions as to the rationale of choosing the number of firms to be
used in the test of concentration. Rarely does one find any discussion
of contemporary trade usage. Some courts have resorted to counting
the total number of firms in the industry, thus avoiding the arbitrary
choice of a smaller number.22 This alternative, however, fails to indicate
size relationship among industry members, which may be a significant
factor in an industry which has a few members much larger than all
the others. Therefore, a more valid test of concentration can be estab-
lished by setting the number at less than the industry total, provided
22 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.J. 1966).
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such choice is made in consonance with current understanding and
with avoidance of other difficulties.
A. Relationship to Market Shares
Assuming that a test has been devised with reference to trade
usage in determining the Big X, and further that concentration relates
to combined market shares of selected firms rather than the qualita-
tive change in the character of an industry member as discussed in
Von's Grocery, the next question is whether the concentration so fre-
quently referred to in the opinions is something other than the com-
bined market shares.
Clearly, the market share of parties to a merger constitutes the
prime test of legality. Thus, if Bethlehem proposes to acquire Youngs-
town and the result is an increase in Bethlehem's market share from
fifteen to twenty percent, the resulting industrial structure may be
found objectionable. On that basis alone, the merger may be illegal.
If the merger is prohibited, the courts are likely to refer to the exis-
tence of concentration in the industry. Thus in a case involving the
proposed absorption of Mack Trucks by Chrysler Corporation the
court gave as a reason for enjoining the merger the fact that the "Big
Four" already sold from eighty-three to ninety percent of all trucks
made in the United States and that such concentration had increased
in the period from 1950 to 1963.23 Whether concentration alone may
constitute a test for legality is discussed in the cases only to the extent
that the type of concentration involved in Von's Grocery presented the
Court with the repugnance of a mergerY 4
Such considerations lead to the question of whether concentration
should be an independent test of the validity of a merger. In other
words, if the combined market share of the merging parties is not ob-
jectionable, should the existence of concentration be a ground for the
application of section 7 of the Clayton Act? Here a first consideration
23 United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 656 (D.N.J. 1964). Cf. United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 587, 604 (S.DN.Y. 1958).
24 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). A contrary view, with
respect to the older type of concentration, is expressed in Hall & Phillips, "Antimerger
Criteria: Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and Size," 9 Vill. L. Rev. 211, 218 (1964).
Professor Bok suggested that an acquisition by someone other than a leading firm in an
industry should be unlawful if it caused an increase in concentration. Bok, "Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 313
(1960). Professor Bok's test, however, appears to focus on market shares rather than
concentration in general.
Some language suggesting the result implied in the text, however, will be found in
Marine Corp. v. Board of Governors, 325 F.2d 960, 969 (7th Cir. 1963). Cf. Farm
Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 44 (1956).
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is whether one of the parties to the merger is a member of the Big X.
If so, reference to concentration is scarcely required. Obviously, a
company in the Big X group will have a relatively large market share.
Assuming that Bethlehem already had fifteen percent of the market
for steel, it is perhaps fair to say, without more, that any substantial
addition thereto should be illegal. If Bethlehem was among the Big X
of the steel industry, the combined market share of those X, aside
from that part held by Bethlehem, might be without significance. Here
again we come back to the question of whether it is permissible to
enlarge the number so as to include one of the merging parties in the
Big X. If Bethlehem had been the seventh largest producer would it
have been proper to include it in a Big Seven?
We have already discussed the problem of properly defining the
number of firms in the Big X. The question now is whether concen-
tration, apart from market shares, is a factor which should be con-
sidered in mergers. Varying the absolute number of firms in the
industry illustrates this problem. Take an industry with one hundred
firms of equal size. Here each firm would have one percent of the
market; any merger between two would result in a combined two per-
cent. Obviously there is no concentration by any standard we have
known before. Hence, that factor should not be taken into account.
On the other hand, if the size of the one hundred firms is not evenly
distributed and the four largest have ninety percent of the market, a
merger of numbers forty-five and seventy-two with the resulting mar-
ket share of two-tenths of one percent seems to create little problem
of either concentration or excessive market shares. The only question
it does raise is that of countervailing power. We can increase the per-
centages without changing the result. Take an industry of one hundred
firms in which the Big Five enjoy an aggregate fifty percent of the
market. Number six, with five percent of the market, wants to acquire
number eight, with three percent. If that transaction is permitted to
stand, the Big Six will enjoy fifty-eight percent of the market. We are
not aware of any calculus whereby it can be shown that it is better or
worse for five firms to hold fifty percent than for six to hold fifty-eight
percent. The important, controlling fact is that number six's market
share will rise from five to eight percent.
Consider now a ten firm industry. In such an industry, if firm
size is evenly distributed with each firm having a ten percent market
share, any merger will appreciably increase the combined market
share of the merging parties. On the other hand, if the Big Four in such
a ten firm industry enjoy ninety percent of the market it is entirely
possible that a merger of numbers five and nine, for example, with a
1967]
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combined market share of only 1.5 percent, will again raise no issue,
except possibly that the merger should be encouraged on the grounds
of countervailing power. One can imagine cases in which "umbrella-
holding" seems an active possibility. In an industry of ten firms, for
example, if the Big Two enjoy eighty percent of the market, the
smaller enterprises may well be dominated by the larger. Suppose that
number three, with five percent of the market, proposed to acquire
number seven, with three percent. If that transaction were permitted,
one could thereafter say that the Big Three held eighty-eight percent
of the market. We are unable to perceive that such a change is
necessarily for the worse. Furthermore, using the Big Three as the
appropriate number for testing concentration may well be arbitrary.
Why not stop at two, or jump to four? On the other hand, wholly
apart from the large aggregate market share of the Big Two or Three,
one might well conclude that adding three to five percent by acquisition
should be deemed unlawful.
There is this difference, however, between the one hundred firm
industry and the ten firm industry: there are more decision-making
units in the multifirm industry and, even though market shares may be
similarly distributed, the absolute number of competitors may be
important for some purposes. Nothing therein, however, suggests that
concentration alone and apart from the market shares of the parties
to the merger is relevant. If concentration is already high and the
merger does not add to it (i.e. neither of the parties to the merger is
in the Big X), then all one can say is that possibly the merger should
be encouraged on the grounds of countervailing power.2 5
B. Origins of Concentration
Assuming nevertheless that concentration is to be given weight in
merger litigation apart from the measurement of market shares, a
question arises as to whether the origin of such concentration is rele-
25 The contrary view is expressed in United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.DN.Y. 1965), wherein the court said at 930:
A merger between firms occupying the same markets is known as a horizontal
merger. Necessarily, such a merger combines the shares of the constituent parties
and eliminates one firm from the market. It thereby automatically creates a
firm with an increased share and increases concentration of the number of
firms in the market.
It is submitted that the foregoing views reflect a failure to distinguish between an
increase in market shares and the existence of concentration.
With respect to the illustration in the text it should be noted that in an industry
wherein firms are numerous entry is not likely to be difficult and hence no degree of
concentration is dangerous.
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vant. In some cases courts have thought it significant that concentra-
tion existed and had arisen through mergers in the industry. 6 In
other instances concentration arising from causes other than merger
seems to have been equally damaging. 7 Whatever doubts may have
existed on the subject were recently eradicated by the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.2s that tribunal explicitly stated:
We have not overlooked Pabst's contention that we should not
consider the steady trend toward concentration in the beer industry
because the Government has not shown that the trend is due to
mergers. There is no duty on the Government to make such proof. It
would seem fantastic to assume that part of the concentration in the
beer industry has not been due to mergers but even if the Govern-
ment made no such proof, it would not aid Pabst. Congress, in pass-
ing § 7 and in amending it with the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger
amendment, was concerned with arresting concentration in the
American economy, whatever its cause, in its incipiency....
We hold that a trend toward concentration in an industry,
whatever its causes, is a highly relevant factor in deciding how sub-
stantial the anticompetitive effect of a merger may be.29
Existence of concentration may reflect either factors of indi-
visibility or prior attempts to gain market power. The latter ex-
planation, of course, is more likely if the concentration has resulted
from merger activity. In the absence of a showing that concentration
has resulted from earlier acquisitions, the court may be flying in the
face of forces which it cannot control. In a typical industry the number
of manufacturers is likely to grow rapidly as the popularity of the
product increases. In 1946, for example, there were twenty-eight manu-
facturers of television sets. By 1951, the number had risen to one
hundred. At that point, however, economies of scale were felt in the
industry and by 1959, the number of manufacturers had fallen to
thirty-seven."S In such circumstances prevention of a merger may
simply deny the parties an opportunity to meet the lower costs of their
competitors and hence impair rather than promote competition.
26 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 941, 948
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
27 United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 656 (D.N.J. 1964); United
States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966). A contrary view
was expressed in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 493 (E.D. Wis.
1964), rev'd, 384 U.S. 546 (1966). Accord, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F.
Supp. 976, 981, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev'd, 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
28 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
29 Id. at 552-53.
30 Bell, "The Maturing TV Industry," 30 J. Mktg. 12 (1966). Note that shifts in
demand may also affect the number of firms in an industry.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
When mergers coincident with a thinning of the ranks arise out
of the play of natural forces, a difficult problem arises. How can the
court be sure that the forces of indivisibility are operating as rapidly
as the merger movement? Is it desirable to allow some firms to merge
and achieve economies of scale while preventing others from doing
so? A solution to such problems seems so difficult to achieve that
possibly all mergers should be blocked and the bankruptcy courts al-
lowed to dispose of the firms which cannot survive alone.
C. Low Concentration
One might imagine that, if the existence of concentration were a
reason to enjoin a merger, the lack of such concentration would con-
stitute a favorable factor in considering the legality of a joinder of
two enterprises. If no group of firms in the industry (the Big X)
enjoyed a combined market share of significant size, it would seem to
follow that the industry was deconcentrated and, therefore, that merger
did not present a hazard to competition.31 This hypothesis, however,
was tested in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States32 where the Supreme
Court took the opposite position. There the evidence showed that
there were many shoemakers in the industry and that the twenty-four
largest manufacturers only produced about thirty-five percent of the
national output. But the lack of concentration did not prevent the
Court from holding the merger invalid.3 In so ruling it wrote:
Congress was desirous of preventing the formation of further
oligopolies with their attendant adverse effects upon local control
of industry and upon small business. Where an industry was com-
posed of numerous independent units, Congress appeared anxious to
preserve this structure.34
The Court went on to indicate that the fact of fragmentation in the
retail end of the industry was a reason to find the merger invalid
despite the low market shares of the participants.
31 Distinguish a situation in which the market shares of the party are themselves
low.
32 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
33 Id. at 322, 333.
34 Id. at 333. In the same case it was said at 343-4:
The market share which companies may control by merging is one of the
most important factors to be considered when determining the probable effects of
the combination on effective competition in the relevant market. In an industry
as fragmented as shoe retailing, the control of substantial shares of the trade in a
city may have important effects on competition. If a merger achieving
5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future merger
efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares.
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From what has been said above, however, it would follow that
fragmentation should be just as irrelevant as concentration. In either
situation the important question is whether the combined market
shares of the merging parties would substantially reduce competition.
As we have sought to demonstrate, whether the rest of the industry
be concentrated or fragmented makes no difference.
D. A Trend in Concentration
We have seen that the courts refer to the existence of concentra-
tion as an adverse factor in antimerger litigation. Another question
arises as to whether the trend of concentration should be given weight
in such cases. In this connection we are speaking of concentration,
not of the market shares of the parties to the merger. If the market
shares of the parties have been moving either upward or downward,
that may cast some light on the structural effects of permitting an
acquisition. 5 This is different from observing a trend, upward or down-
ward, in the combined share of the Big X companies in the industry.
The cases clearly indicate that an upward trend in concentration
is a factor adverse to the validity of a merger. In Brown Shoe the
Supreme Court in blocking the merger expressly referred to a "trend
toward concentration in the industry." 6 The statute prohibits a given
merger only if the effect of that merger is to lessen competition sub-
stantially. The Court asserted, however, that the trend toward con-
centration is relevant in determining whether the merger will have that
prohibited effect.T Other decisions have echoed this thought. On the
other hand, a trend away from concentration seems to be disregarded
or treated as of little significance.
31
If we are correct in believing that the existence of concentration is
irrelevant, it would follow that a trend in that direction is likewise of
no concern. In other words, a decline in the combined market share
of the Big X firms in a given industry is not a factor which should
lead a court to consider a merger valid. If the market shares of the
parties to the merger are themselves objectionable, whether the shares
35 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v.
Continental Oil Co., 237 F. Supp. 294 (WM). Okla. 1964). Cf. United States v. Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 932, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
36 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322, 333 (1962).
z7 Id. at 315, 332; United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp.
867, 950 (SMD.N.Y. 1965). Indeed in Hanover Trust there is a suggestion that proof of
a trend toward concentration is an essential part of the plaintiff's case. Id. at 941.
-8 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 948-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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of the Big X are increasing or declining should neither save nor hinder
the merger. Here again forces of indivisibility may be at work; an
industry may be shrinking and concentration increasing because
economies of scale are thus achieved. On the other hand, membership
in an industry may be increasing solely by reason of the fact that the
industry is running along the upward swing of its growth cycle. We
deem it hazardous to rely on an analysis of such causal relationships.
Furthermore, for the reasons set out, we can find no relevance in the
whole concept of concentration.
E. Vertical and Other Mergers
The discussion up to this point has concerned horizontal mergers.
We have argued that the existence of concentration is irrelevant in
determining the legality of acquiring a competing firm. Similarly, it
has been suggested that the existence of a trend toward or away from
concentration does not affect the validity of a horizontal merger.
We turn now to other types of mergers. When the parties to an
acquisition are related as buyer and seller, their merger is said to be
vertical in character. It might be argued that in such a situation the
fact of concentration in the market of the acquired firm would make
foreclosure more likely. Certainly that would be the case if the merger
involved one of the Big X in the acquired firm's industry. That result,
however, flows merely from the fact that the acquired firm had a large
market share. As in the case of horizontal mergers, nothing is added
by demonstrating that the Big X enjoy a large proportion of industry
sales.
Take, for example, the acquisition of one of the major three
automobile manufacturers by a steel mill. Under the foreclosure
doctrine that acquisition would no doubt reduce the opportunity of
other steel mills to sell to the acquired automobile manufacturer. The
fact of concentration in the automobile industry, however, does not
reduce the tonnage which can be moved into automotive markets.
When the merger takes the form of diversification or geographic
dispersion, the fact of concentration seems even less relevant. In some
recent decisions the FTC has blocked mergers in the nature of geo-
graphic dispersion on the ground that the acquiring firm was a poten-
tial competitor who was thus removed from the market." In other cases
such mergers have been barred on the "deep pocket" theory that they
would unduly enhance competition in the acquired field.40 Neither of
those doctrines is related to the existence or lack of concentration.
39 Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
40 Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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Let us illustrate the situation. Suppose the Borden Company, a
nationwide dairy firm not otherwise engaged in business in Topeka,
Kansas, purchases an existing dairy plant in that city. Does it make a
difference whether the dairy business in Topeka is then concentrated
in a Big Three or Big Four? If concentration exists, Borden may have
bought a plant included in the Big X. The significance of the fact of
concentration cannot be assessed in evaluating the impact of that
purchase on competition. If the plant is in the Big X group, it pre-
sumably is relatively large. That fact, however, is independent of the
existence of concentration. If the plant purchased was not part of the
Big X, and it is assumed that Borden has ample resources with which
to modernize facilities and otherwise compete vigorously, the fact
of concentration again seems to have little bearing on the outcome
unless one resorts to the doctrine of countervailing power. In that
event, of course, the Borden purchase would appear to intensify com-
petition.
Similar considerations are applicable when a merger takes the
form of diversification into a new industry or a new product. In both
geographic dispersion and diversification it is difficult to find a theory
under which injury to competition may be found. Conceivably, im-
pairment of potential competition or some other doctrine may be in-
voked in attacking such a merger. The existence of concentration or
fragmentation, however, in either the acquired or acquiring industry,
seems to bear no rational relationship to the purposes of the antimerger
laws.41
V. CONCLUSION
We have examined the role of concentration in antimerger litiga-
tion. In many instances, particularly those involving horizontal merg-
ers, courts have deemed the existence of concentration an adverse
factor. Oddly enough the lack of concentration has not been con-
sidered a favorable factor. While existence of concentration is closely
linked to the market shares of the participants to a merger, a sub-
ject which is indeed relevant to the resolution of such litigation, it
is believed that concentration in and of itself does not bear a rational
relationship to the purposes of section 7 of the Clayton Act and allied
legislation.
41 Contra, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Nothing herein is intended to imply that the concept of concentration is not relevant
in proceedings other than antimerger cases. For example, in determining whether a tariff
should be raised or reduced it might be highly important.
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